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Vladimir Orlov: “Russia and the United States should resume a comprehensive dialogue on global nuclear proliferation threats” image

On January 19, 2021, Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov, Director of the PIR Center, gave an interview to Security Index journal.


SECURITY INDEX: In your recent op-ed column, co-authored with Sergey Semenov and published by Kommersant Daily, you stated that “Russia and the United States, as major nuclear-weapo...

Heather A. Conley, Vladimir Orlov, Gen. Evgeny Buzhinsky, Cyrus Newlin, Sergey Semenov and Roksana Gabidullina
The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Principles of Engagement and New Approaches image

As one of its first security policy decisions, the Biden administration agreed to extend the New START Treaty for five years with no conditions.  The New START Treaty represents one of the last remaining vestiges of international arms control architecture and one of the few areas of potentially prod...

Now when the U.S. presidential elections are over the fate of the START Treaty and nuclear arms control, in general, has become clearer.

The New START treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2021, and only a few months ago there was little doubt that it would be the end of it. The Trump administratio...

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Nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia within Vision 2030 Program: Prospects for nuclear energy cooperation and nonproliferation risks

Inna Rodina
Nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia within Vision 2030 Program: Prospects for nuclear energy cooperation and nonproliferation risks image

Saudi Arabia is considered a nuclear “newcomer”. Although Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program dates back to the 1960s, the kingdom has demonstrated significant interest in nuclear energy only over the last decade. The Saudi interest in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is due to several reasons, among which both general for all Middle Eastern nuclear “newcomers” and specific only to the kingdom. Under the Saudi Vision 2030, nuclear energy is one of the key components of the kingdom’s successful development.

Despite the Saudi ambitious plans in the nuclear energy field that were posed ten years ago, no visible progress has been reached yet. One of the possible reasons is concerns of the nuclear supplier countries and their reluctance to contribute to the nuclear power program in the kingdom. Indeed, Saudi Arabia poses a threat to the nonproliferation regime. The research studies the ways through which the kingdom can acquire nuclear weapons. It concludes that currently, Saudi Arabia has the insufficient infrastructure to build nuclear weapons, as it has no facilities for the conversion, enrichment, or production of uranium fuel, nor any reprocessing facilities. However, Saudi Arabia has ballistic missiles that it has been purchasing from China since 1987.

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Security Index №6(21), March 2021