The IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement (with the participation of Euroatom) regarding the peaceful nuclear activities of Great Britain comes into force.
The adoption of two Memorandums of the Zangger Committee. Memorandum A defined the source and special fissionable materials. Memorandum B gave the description of equipment or material designed to work with fissionable material.



PIR Center continues a new section "PIR Test". This project in the form of a game carries equally educational, research and analytical meaning. Users are given the opportunity to take the test - to answer one of the designated questions. Our today's PIR Test is dedicated to the international document that is considered to be the very first to become the forerunner of the modern arms control system.


PIR Center is taking part in the 10th NPT Review Conference on August 1-26, 2022, where for almost a month at the UN headquarters in New York, delegations from 191 signatory countries of the NPT will discuss the implementation of this important agreement in the field of international security.


This research paper attempts to place nuclear disarmament and arms control in the context of the sustainable development agenda. In particular, the paper examines the possibility of applying the experience and specific mechanisms of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to create new incentives for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Considering the devastating environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use, the nuclear-weapon states should take responsibility for possessing nuclear weapons just as they took responsibility for carbon emissions.


The 2022 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, inherited from covid 2020 and repeatedly postponed due to the raging pandemic, opens in New York on August 1. Four weeks of work of the NPT member States delegations – what will it be: a breakthrough to a more reliable cementing of the Treaty? Beating around the bush and straining to demonstrate its own indispensability? Or a harsh disputes that will call into question both the value and the effectiveness of this document?

Evgeny Maslin reflections on the PIR Center monograph “Russia-U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Dialogue: Lessons Learned and Road Ahead”

U.S.-Russian relations in their current form infuse me with little optimism. Even where the common interest is evident – in the nuclear nonproliferation domain, in the cause of preventing a nuclear conflict, divergencies in stances are unprecedentedly wide, there being little or no normal respectful engagement. That is not who it should be! Our countries can and should cooperate – and the rest of the world expects such partnership from us.

That is why the new PIR Center monograph Russia-U.S. Dialogue on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Lessons Learned and Road Ahead is as relevant as never before. Its leitmotiv, the key lesson learned is that our nations` interests diverge in many areas, but that does not justify renouncing cooperation on everything.

For me as a practitioner rather than an armchair scholar, the importance of cooperation between our countries is no mere word and no abstraction. In the 1990s and later the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense that I led in 1992-1997, was directly involved in the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. As a result of that program, we managed to concentrate all Soviet nuclear warheads on the Russian soil.  À propos, it is 25 years since the last nuclear warheads were withdrawn from Ukraine following three years of intensive talks. The security and safety of transporting nuclear warheads by car and by rail had greatly increased. Emergency response system for addressing possible accidents with nuclear weapons has been established, emergency teams had been provided with modern equipment. In the 2000s nuclear arsenals were instrumented with nuclear security systems.

That was only one of many directions of CTR program: active work was carried out by Minatom to eliminate decommissioned nuclear submarines. This activity was aimed at precluding fissile material smuggling, mitigating possible proliferation risks and was in line with both Russian and U.S. interests.

I am confident that there are enough spheres where Russian and U.S. interests overlap even now.

New PIR Center`s book is addressed to those Russian and American specialists, diplomats, military men, scholars, who like their predecessors in Cold War times, defended the national interests through dialogue rather than confrontation. And I am sure that a thoughtful, unbiased reader will find good food for thought in this book.

In my view, it is particularly important that there are many young people, junior specialists among the authors. If the youth on both shores of Bering Strait puts their thoughts into how to rectify the Russian-U.S. relations, I am optimistic.


Evgeny Maslin,

Colonel General (retired),
Head, 12th Main Directorate of
the Ministry of Defense (1992-1997);
Member of PIR Center Executive Board