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Dual Degree Program in Nonproliferation Studies

'Non-proliferation and global security – current problems'

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As delivered

Glad to have the opportunity to share ideas with students of today. My engagement in disarmament negotiations began in 1962, when as a legal advisor I joined Ms Alva Myrdal at the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The ENDC was the precursor to today's Geneva Conference that has been in coma for some 20 years. In the 1960s, 70s, 80s and first half of the 90s it was alive and relatively productive.

Since the second half of the 90s the disarmament **gearshift** has been **in the reverse**. My generation can be proud of many things that have been achieved in the world since WWII – emancipation of colonial territories, growing and widening emancipation of women, economic development, etc. However, the arms stocks are bigger than ever and we have evidently failed to remove the risk of war – the primary task of the UN. It falls on **your generation to reduce the risk of war and to spare the world from spending some 1.700 billion dollars annually for military purposes.**

Do I have any **advice**? Yes, **study!** Be knowledgeable. Today it is easier to access reports and writings than ever before. You need a **comprehensive picture** and understanding both of the past and of the present. And you need to apply **critical minds** to all that is said and written – including what I say!

The two greatest threats that I see to our civilization are **Global warming** that poses the risk of a **slow suicide**, and **Nuclear war** that poses the risk of a **quick suicide**.

In the 1980s public opinion was much engaged in the nuclear risk.

Since the East-West détente in the early 90s the public's awareness and fear of the nuclear risk has diminished and the environmental has increased. I remain deeply concerned about both. There is no longer the struggle between a market economy world and a Communist world but there are still old and new rivalries and risks of nuclear war by error and misunderstandings. The political climate is acid and erratic. The biosphere climate also seems increasingly erratic and the high seas are more acid! I worry about the world being **too slow** in shifting to a **low CO2 economy**. I welcome the drastic drop in the cost of solar power but I regret the continued resistance to civilian **nuclear power** that is a major means of giving the world CO2 free base load power.

However, I shall not talk about the **risks** of global warming but about the risks of war and nuclear weapons short term and long term. And about opportunities.

Imminent risks: DPRK, IRAN

**Arms races and break down of several
disarmament agreements**

Imminent opportunities? Ukraine? Syria?

Longer term risks and opportunities:

Risks: Move from a unipolar world to a **multipolar one**.

Rivalries like China/US, China/ India.

Opportunities: Growing global integration (MED)

Legal norms, development of joint institutions, like UN.

IMMINENT RISKS: First DPRK

- The current crisis regarding the Korean peninsula is an explosive relic from the Cold War and the Korean war of 1950s. The DPRK identifies the US as its lasting adversary. Any **long term solution** will require a broad security settlement involving the US and countries in the region.
- However, this is long term. There are now **acute** threats and other measures must be found to reduce them. DPRK has advanced so far that it is **able to send nuclear carrying missiles** within its own region and could, in a not very distant future, be **able to attack the US**.
- Such action is extremely unlikely, but this will not be enough to calm the US public. The US will feel a need to **exclude** the risk, if **further DPRK long range missile testing and nuclear testing** were not soon to be brought to an end.
- **HOW could this be brought about?**
- The US tells us that **all options are on the table**. Here are some:
- A **preventive strike** of nuclear and missile targets in the DPRK is **one option** discussed. However, DPRK retaliatory capacity would be likely to survive. It would be a very unattractive option.
- The **option** that has been pursued so far and has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and gained the support of China, is one of increased **economic and political pressures** on DPRK to accept **denuclearization**.

- We do not know whether this approach will work. It is also uncertain whether **China**, though eager to press the DPRK is ready to go so far as to risk a collapse of the DPRK regime. China does not want to have US allied troops at the Yalu River and perhaps risk a massive inflow of **refugees**.
- A **third option** – which I and many others support – is **de-escalation** achieved through **diplomacy**. As is customary in all negotiating situations neither party wants to sound eager and starting bids, if any are unrealistic
- The **US has declared** that it is ready to sit down and talk, **but** only about **DPRK denuclearization**. In other words: a generous offer to discuss the other party's unilateral disarmament.
- The **DPRK** seems equally generous to be ready to talk, but only about its own **recognition** as a '**nuclear weapon state**'.
- **Both parties know** that **at this stage** such demands are **out of reach**.
- Through various spokespersons the US has indicated that it does not seek **regime change in the DPRK** or any **change in the division** of Korea. While not of immediate relevance and not welcome to human rights defenders, the signal is helpful in the context of a negotiation with DPRK.
- A US-South Korean readiness to **suspend** various **military exercises**, '**drills**' and demonstrations that the DPRK perceives as threats, would be a significant and serious offer in a diplomatic process.
- A **reciprocal DPRK offer could be** what the US, South Korea and the world needs most at this stage - an open-ended **suspension by the DPRK of all testing of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons**.
A **reciprocal arrangement**, whether manifested in parallel declarations or otherwise and however engineered diplomatically, would have some clear **benefits**:
 - The most significant **threat to the US would be put off in time**, as a period of **testing** would be needed for the DPRK to develop effective ballistic missiles.
 - **No mutual confidence would be needed for** the suspension of actions. The DPRK would **keep** the **missiles** and **nuclear bombs** it regards as its life insurance and would no doubt continue lab and construction work – but it **could not do more testing**. The other side would retain all its capacities for military action and for deliberately demonstrating them. If either side were to breach its commitment, the other side could do the same.
 - **Lastly, no special mechanism of verification is needed**. The testing of missiles and nuclear bombs and the pursuit of big military exercises can be widely observed. The longer suspensions would hold the more confidence may grow and the more time would be made available for **exploring longer term arrangements**.

Second, the UN Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for IRAN

With the deep-rooted conflicts in the Middle East region many nuclear non-proliferation efforts have failed. Israel developed nuclear weapons

without acknowledging it. Most recently there has been a failure to call a conference to discuss a **zone free of weapons of mass destruction**.

- By contrast, after years of talks a **Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA)** was developed between Iran and the E3+3 (Germany). It was designed to assure the world that Iran's nuclear energy program could not for a long time be used to develop nuclear weapons.
- The detailed and extensive program has been given legal force through a resolution of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. (Res.2231/2015).
- Under Art.25 of the Charter **all members of the organization have become legally bound to carry out** the decision, including its provisions about the lifting of earlier Security Council imposed **economic sanctions**.
- While the deal has been almost universally welcomed, the **Trump administration**, Israel's executive government and some Arab states have expressed extreme **dissatisfaction**, viewing it as one-sided in favour of Iran and of insufficient duration.
- I confess I find it difficult to accept this reasoning. The way I read the joint program, no one pays and all gain. The E3+3 and the world simply **drops sanctions** imposed – which is not very onerous. Iran discards parts of a nuclear program that were not needed to obtain electricity and other peaceful benefits. Iran also accepts reporting and inspections beyond standard NPT rules to help maintain confidence that its nuclear aims are peaceful.
- President Trump has now refrained from certifying to the US Congress that Iran is fulfilling its obligations and **said** that in his view the JCPOA does not serve the national interest of the US. It is hard to predict whether US congress will legislate about new sanctions that the President has not asked for and what he will do if Congress does not impose new measures.
- There is a **worrisome parallel** between the current ignoring of IAEA inspection results in Iran and the ignoring of them before the war against Iraq in 2003. Perhaps in the case of Iran after the JCPOA as in the case of Iraq in 2003 the **concern** about a **nuclear** development is mainly a selling point: in **Iraq** to sell an invasion and a regime change. In **Iran** to resell sanctions and financial obstacles to retard economic development that will make Iran an even more powerful factor in the Middle East.
- The President's message to Congress is an **internal US act** and does not, per se affect the internationally accepted agreement. However, if congressional action leads the US to re-impose economic sanctions lifted by the Security Council, the US would come **into conflict** with its international obligations.
- A breach by the US would **damage** the JCPOA deal, but it would not invalidate it, as the package of rules and arrangements is binding for the whole UN membership. Other states – Iran, itself and perhaps most members of the UN might continue to respect it and the complex **dispute settlement mechanism** could be set in motion.
- What is certain is that a breaching of obligations without valid legal cause would **disastrously impact on US credibility** as an ally and party in treaty relations.

- There would be a special risk that agreement with the **DPRK** could become even more problematic, if the US of today were seen as an unpredictable actor.
- I note that President Trump in his appearance before the UN General Assembly spoke about the **potential** that he saw in the UN. This potential – most importantly to defuse world controversies – I assume the US President wished to strengthen. If so, the US a chief member of the Security Council, should confirm – not ignore – decisions that it has itself helped to shape and take.
- I note, lastly, that there is solid resistance to any renegotiation of the contents or duration of the binding provisions of the SC's Iran nuclear package. On the other hand, perhaps Iran's **missile program** which is a separate matter on which the SC has adopted only non-binding provisions, could be taken up for consideration.

Risks to existing agreements on arms control and disarmament

- The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (**INF**) agreement 1987. Accusations of breaches are currently made mutually.
- The 1991 '**presidential initiative**' (Bush Sr and Gorbachev) comprising parallel declarations regarding the destruction of categories of tactical nuclear weapons
- The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (**CTBT**) of 1996 might remain in limbo as a result of non-ratification by the US and other states.
- The **new START** of 2010, that reduced deployed nuclear arms and missiles and provided for mutual verification, might not be extended or replaced by a new treaty.

Imminent opportunities

- While it is rightly said that international tension is no good excuse for the absence of disarmament talks but rather an additional reason to talk, the **grim reality** is that **tensions** may place many kinds of disarmament agreements out of reach.
- To increase the chances for positive action on its own agenda, I think the disarmament community should use its considerable brain power **more on ways to improve the political interstate climate.**
- I do not propose to examine the evolution that moved the **bipolar** world to become **unipolar and that is now moving it toward multi-polarity.** Much of this process took place without conflict and pain, but the process before and after the **EU-Ukraine association agreement** has been like an ocean liner moored to Russia cutting its moorings and sailing away to EU.
- Following the in my view **Russian fomented events** in the Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine the parties remain in **a low level armed conflict and sanctions** imposed upon Russia by EU countries and the US.
- Underneath this simmering conflict there are geopolitical concerns. There will be a need to reconcile long term aims and trade rules: there are those in the EU and in the US who **suspect Russia of ambitions** to re-establish power beyond its present borders and who seek to **strengthen NATO** to resist such expansion. **In Russia**, there are those who suspect **NATO of an ambition** to expand up to Russian borders and into Central Asia.

- I think there is a need to dispel these suspicions. **Russia** might confirm that it seeks no expansion whether to the South, North, East or West. **NATO** might make it clear that it does not aim to become a Western military arm with a global reach.
- At the moment, there is an urgent need to reach some **reconciliation with and about the Ukraine**. The conflict is **painful to all** and settlement would go some way to lower East-West tensions and **obstacles to arms control**. What would be required?
- In my view reconciliation and lifting of sanctions will require acceptance by all of uncompromised Ukrainian sovereignty over **Eastern Ukraine** up to the Russian border – perhaps supervised by UN forces added to OSCE observers. It will require respect for the **Ukraine's choice of economic-social system**, a mechanism to **reconcile** the new free Ukrainian trade with EU with continued free trade with Russia. And an understanding that **NATO is not** moving up to Russia's border. On the **Crimea** we cannot hope for agreement. Like some other situations in the world the difference will remain a **frozen** conflict.
- **The conflict in Syria** has been grim and long-lasting with foreign countries supporting various fighting groups. This has inevitably placed **strains on** the international climate of cooperation including that of arms control. It still does. At the same time, the complex conflict injected elements of international cooperation. The medieval conduct and philosophy of ISIS met unanimous global condemnation and resulted in military action, where many states – including the US and Russia – operated side by side. The whole world has also united in condemnation of the use of **chemical weapons**. Again, there was US-Russian cooperation resulting in remarkable Security Council interaction with the Syrian government to remove chemical weapons from the country.
- At present there seems to be good prospects of defeating ISIS and chances of phasing out other hostilities. If this were to happen and some kind of equilibrium were to result with UN approval it would above all ease the pains in Syria, but it might also somewhat improve the political atmosphere in which disarmament measures can be discussed.

Longer term hazards and opportunities

- As is well known, predictions are difficult – especially about the future... We can perhaps foresee that the transformation of the world **from unipolar to multipolar** may not be free from friction and controversy. For some time already we have seen how the US has been preparing the so called **pivot** to meet a much stronger Asia including a fast developing self-assured China.
- **Let us hope** that China will continue the **peaceful rise** urged by Deng Tsiao Ping and that the US and the world will welcome Brazil, China, India, Russia and others to play a more vigorous role within common international institutions and rules systems.
- We have registered and welcomed China's support of freer trade at a time when the US seems to move away from it. We have welcomed that billion populated China and India and continent spanning Russia recognize the threat to the world's climate and support action to protect it.

- But let us also be awake to future **hazards!** We have registered controversy over islands in the Pacific and the **South China Sea** and frictions between China and India over their border in the Himalayas. We must further note the increasing military expenses not least in China and South East Asia. It will require pragmatism and prudence by governments to avoid clashes and conflicts.
- In my view there are fortunately **factors** that favour peaceful state relations in the future. **Although globalization** has some negative features the **growing interdependence between states suggests to** governments and peoples to avoid conflicts and war. Partners in rapidly accelerating valuable trade relations will think twice before they allow themselves to impair or cut relations. We used to talk about nuclear war as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Today, I think we should talk about MED – Mutual Economic Dependence.
- Monnet's and Schuman's driving idea behind European integration **was that 'industrial and economic interdependence will force European states to maintain peace'**. They were right. After two thousand years of bloody big and small wars in Western Europe today's Europeans find war between European states unthinkable. Brexit will lead to big costs – but not to war. I think globalization leads in the same direction in the whole world.
- Lastly, **norms and institutions**. Peace in states are built upon many things but generally accepted legal norms and organized institutions for governance and for the settlement of disputes are invariably a part of a society without strife. We have still a long way to go to reach this in the international society, but in the period after the end of World War II we have made great strides.
- Vast areas of human relations are covered by accepted legal bilateral, regional or universal **norms**. Take the law of the sea, take trade relations under WTO, take human rights. Respect is heterogeneous, but we can see the growth of international regulation in many fields – aviation, finance, communications...
- The number and coverage of intergovernmental institutions has also been growing fast after WWII. We see much criticism of the UN, but while the League of Nations lasted for twenty years – between the First and the Second World War – the United Nations has now been in operation for over 70 years. It enables all states in the world to be heard and to be a part of cooperation. It has a collective security system with much power – when the five permanent members of the **Security Council** agree. They do that much more often than most people think. Most cases do not get media attention. A few do. The intervention in 1991 to stop Iraq's **occupation of Kuwait** was the first big case. The agreement to remove **chemical weapons from Syria** was another and the agreement on **Iran's nuclear program** was a third. What we see, I think, is the shaky beginning of an international community organizing for peace.

Q&A session:

Orlov: When you are speaking about Iran and JCPOA, you indicated that yes, there is a certain possibility, if I understand you correctly, that the missile issue would be taken separately as a kind of a separate bargain. Do you think we can have a chance of some parallel process adding to the value of the JCPOA but addressing the broader issues, from missiles to Iran's role in the region? Or it is fully illusionary and misleading, and with that illusion we have a real chance to lose what we already have, which is the JCPOA?

Blix: The missile thing is an off chance. I mentioned it, but I also see people from the Iran and reports from Iran who would not consider it. I know that is the last word and I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about the reaches of missiles in the Middle East. I would like to know how much Russia dislikes the missile defenses in Romania, which they see as threatening to their capacity on the Russian side. I do not know if some modification on the Iranian side would make a difference because the US has defended the missiles in Romania by saying that it defends Europe, and the United States, too, against missiles from Iran and from North Korea.

But there are other things outside the JCPOA. And the Americans are not tired of talking about bad things the Iranians are doing. It is very hard to specify what is it? I think I would like to know, to put the facts on the table. We hear about the Iranians supporting in Yemen, for instance. Well, for some instances, I believe it has been, I believe it is true. How much? How decisive? I think it has been a bit exaggerated. Or there are subversive groups. I do not have the slightest doubt that there is not a monkey business going on in all directions of this area. I am reminded that there are nuclear scientists in Iran that were murdered, several of them were murdered. I do not think the Iranians murdered their own scientists, but somebody did. There is monkey business and there are minorities and I am sure that secret intelligence organizations are operating and trying to get money and weapons to minorities to cause trouble. All right, so they are pointing their fingers at Iranians, so I am sure that the Iranian organizations are pretty. But I do not think it is a specific thing to view and I think we can all agree that to reduce that kind of monkey business will be a good thing. If that can be taken up into discussion, fine. But it's not a one-sided business as I see.

Orlov: Thank you, Hans. I actually share some of your observations here. And now I am ready for one of our students of the Dual Degree Nonproliferation Program, first year.

Q: Good Afternoon. Thank you so much for speaking to us today. This is certainly a very memorable event for me and I think for my classmates. My question concerns CTBT. This treaty, for the most part, with two exceptions, has been observed by most countries. But still, it is not entered into force. You just mentioned how important it is for the agreements to be legalized, to have a full force. So, my question to you is,

in your opinion what can the international community, and us, do to resolve this paradox? What can be the catalyst or the accelerator for this treaty to be finally legalized, signed, and ratified on a national level? Thank you.

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 Blix: I will confess I am somewhat pessimistic. I was also asked this question yesterday, too. What can we do to bring it into force? I think lowering of the temperage in the national community is fundamental to facilitate. But usually we have a treaty that enters into force, and then into operation. The CTBT is the opposite. It enters into operation, but is not in force. Peculiarly enough. But we have the moratorium.

And it is very important that you support the moratorium. The Security Council resolution last autumn did not underline the moratorium. But we also know an enormous amount of research is going on in Russia, in the United States, everywhere. And I think fundamentally that the US Senate does not like to bind the United States to almost anything, that they would like to keep the United States hands-free. Maybe one day, they will do something. Well, if they do, then the pressure of testing will be there. Today, US supporters are not urging the US to any testing. They are going along, but it could happen and I think the senators in Congress, they want to keep that option open. And I think they are, raising a risk for themselves because if we go into a new arms race, they will not be alone. There will be Russia, there will be China, there will be several others. So, we get to a higher level, more expensive level for the same insecurity. And I think that they are wrong, and that is the main obstacle that the US senate is standing against. I can make many arguments as to why they should get along. The first one is that they are risking new arms races. The other one when the countries behind this treaty are criticized by the nuclear weapons, mainly by the US, by the UK, and I think Russia, too, has been negative towards the ban. They said that they should have a step-by-step approach. Well, when did we see any steps? We had start today, but it is very little.

The first strike is not there, the ban is not there. To me, the ratification of the CTBT would be the least difficult of all steps that they could take and I think they have that obligation. But I do not see it happening. I would like to ask the North Koreans the question: they have said that they can denuclearize if all other others decnulcearized. I would like to ask that question: If all others would go along with the CTBT being ratified, would you also go along with that? Now, then they would help the world. Then they would help to bring themselves somewhat more back into the international community. It will also help the world to get the CTBT.

 Orlov: Thank you, Dr. Blix. I think we here in Russia, are also still feeling the aftershocks of the US non-ratification of the CTPT. But we also have

different schools of thought here in Russia, and although Russia had ratified the treaty long ago and is very accurately within the treaty, and I am saying it for the record just to make it clear for all the students that Russia, together with France and the UK, are exemplary nuclear weapon states in this particular case so far, because there are increasing pressures here, asking from the parliament, from different places, from different ministries to our diplomats: Why? While Americans do not do so, why should Russia continue abstaining from testing? Yes, we do have responses for that, but sometimes it is not always that smooth. Sarahbeth?

Q1: Good afternoon. I would just like to thank you for speaking to us. My question is you mentioned the lack of trust in Iraq and Iran with the verification regimes of the weapons of mass destruction and the fact that Iran is complying with the JCPOA. I am American, and in the United States especially, I feel like there is a lack of trust in this institutions. What do you think can be done by the IAEA or by other institutions like it, to create more international trust in the verification regime?

Blix: Well, the lack of trust is rather fundamental from several sides. But the reality is that Iran through the JCPOA, has accepted much further going verification regime than anyone else has done. I was at the IAEA when we developed the 93+2; the additional protocols. We did so after the shock in 1991 when we discovered that our inspectors were enabled to see what was going on. I was happy to say that the secret services did not know it either whether it was the US or elsewhere. But nevertheless, it showed the deficiencies

It was unanimously accepted by our daily conference in 1997, the year when I left the IAEA. But the Iranians have promised that they do apply it in the first place, and that they will ratify it, although that has not happened yet. They also have a vast amount of inspection by the IAEA, and the IAEA are saying that they have complied. And that is what the europeans are also saying.

Now the US would like, or some in the US are saying to “look at this or that”. Now, there are limits to how far you can go in this. In the chemical weapon convention, they have something called “shrouding”, where all countries will always have something do not want to be showing, like the latest design of a weapon or something like that. Inspections are not meant to reveal that kind of thing. They’re meant to give reassurance that there is nothing nuclear. If the Iranians are saying “No, we will not let you into this military lab.” They can give legitimate reasons for it. There might be ways in which they can discuss it, under which they can cover that particular thing. It’s a pragmatic thing. But it is not you can say that everything is opened at any time. If they will open every corner, of course, they will not.

We have to define what is legitimate, and what is not legitimate. I think the Iranians have behaved well, so far. That is what the IAEA says.

I remember when I was still at the IAEA, there was a British newspaper that claimed that somewhere in the Elbrus mountains, there was an enrichment facility that we have not heard about. And so, I went to the Iranian and said, "look, this is what they published. Would not you like to show us that this is wrong, and invite us to go anywhere we want? And they said, "Yeah, fine". And they sent our safeguard chief John, rather an adventurer and helicopter flyer, and he came up there and found an area what was sort of a recreation place for people for the atomic energy commission.

But there was not enough water, not enough power, there was no chance. If countries are accused of something like this, then it is very good. Then they can say "yes" and of course it is self-service, and show that you really are innocent.

Orlov: Thank you, Hansen. In fact, for those that signed up to additional protocol to the IAEA safeguard agreement. This is something that is very important that you witnessed in your position as the director general of IEAA and further on, because this certainly helped to get more transparency in general, although with Iran, we have unprecedented transparency that goes beyond any other documents.

Blix: There is always the problem that you can not prove the negative, as we say. There is always this problem that there is nothing. This is what we up against in the 90s, and were also up against in 2000 and 2003. You can go everywhere and in the last resort, it is a political decision. The inspectors will say, "we had 700 inspections in Iraq and we were able to see over 500 different sites. And we have been to 3 dozen sites given to us by IAEA and did not find any nuclear energy or any weapons relating to mass destruction." And we report that, and that indicates that the weight of evidence is that there is nothing, but you can not say there is nothing at all. And if the state wants to have this possibility open, then they go, "Have you looked at this, have you looked at that?" It is then for the government to decide, "do we want to conclude on this in our actions that there is nothing? Or do we act on our future behavior on these assumptions alone that there still might be something?"

Even in the case of South Africa when they abandoned nuclear weapons and they opened up to the IAEA inspections, we never said after inspections that there is nothing, we said "This is what you have done. It is up to you to decide if you want to act upon your suspicion, on your conclusions, or that there is nothing"

They acted rightly, upon the conclusion that there was not anything.

2Q: Thank you, your honor, for your great speech and comprehensive information provided. I would like to have your opinion about the Iranian risk. If, in your opinion, there is an imminent danger or risk of US strike on direct war on Iraq or Iran, or through proxies, or even collaboration

with Russia through destabilizing Iranian influence? Or in general all together?

Blix: Well, how the relations combined between the big countries involved: US, Russia, Turkey, and Iran is very hard to say because there is common interest now for the moment for Iran and Turkey on the similar line, whereas the US is trying to get Russia to be more critical of Iran. I really do not know because I do not know anyone if they can foresee it. As to what the US's intention of Iran is that, my hunch is that the US does not want to go to war with Iran. There was a time when the US had aircraft carriers in the Gulf during that period and the Iranians could feel threatened, and there was a threat actually. An attack on Iran. It did not happen, but the Iranians could feel that. Today, I do not think that either Israel, the United States or Saudi Arabia want a war or want to attack Iran. My suspicion is that they are worried about Iran as a future strong economy. They want to have sanctions remain because sanctions will hurt the further increase of annual growth of Iran. But the sanctions certainly play a role. They would like to certainly reimpose sanctions to retard Iran. 80 million people, and a big chunk in the Middle East and both Israel and Saudi Arabia. I dislike the motivation because I think that to threaten a country that is trying to develop its people from poverty and trying to retard them, to me it is immoral to do so. And whether they will succeed, I do not know. That does not matter. The US trade with Iran is rather negligible. The Europeans, the Chinese, and the Indians and other countries continue to trade with them, well, that is a big chunk. The US influence on the financial markets is enormous. Various transfers, economic resources, dollars often pass through US hands. Therefore, they have an influence and I think even now, there are effects of the US financial attitude towards investments with Iran on Western companies. Western companies want to invest but they do not want trouble with their relations with American companies. My hunch is that it is mainly an economic threat of retarding Iran that they are after.

Q: You mentioned, and I do agree, the risk of arms stockpile, which in the past few years has been increasing dramatically by Saudis, through the purchasing of mass destructive weapons and even more from the US, Canada, and a few European countries but in much lower scale. But Israel has always been on top with the motto: "Let us strike Iran". The security situation I think is more of an issue for Iranian independence and sovereignty before economic.

Flix: Well, it is true that the Iranian military forces are below the resources of the US side and the Arab side. Saudi Arabia has accumulated an enormous amount of military resources, also the Gulf States. But for the US to help start another war in the Middle East, I doubt it. I think that in the US, the idea of going through a new war in the Middle East is very negative. Obama drew the conclusion directly after the Iraq War that he did not want even want the US active in

interactions. The US did not fully intervene in the Libyan War and the Syrian Civil War, again, the US supported some of the democratic forces wherever they were, but they did not go in fully. I think that the US and Trump was somewhat sensitive with some matters to the public matter. I think its military does not want it either. It is a sad situation, and I want to apologize to my american colleagues. But that is what we have to do in present time. I hope that they will succeed. The earlier cases where there short risk of a war, I rather felt indignant because if the Iranians were moving to nuclear weapons of some kind, how can the US take it upon itselfes to intervene as the world policeman? The US has not made a point to be a world policeman. And the UN Charter prohibits the threat of the use of force, unless it is for self-defense. But certainly Iran has not done anything to evoke the self defense on the US side. AND that worries me a little because it shows the little concern for the UN Charter in Washington. Obama, I think, understood it.

But the republicans have a care and ashington has an inclination to look at its size, and its superpower.

And I think that getting to respect the UN Charter, both in form of against direct assault and aggression, and internationally, intervention and subversion is the same thing.

I have hinted that to you that Russia, in the case of Crimea, was not violating the UN Charter in my view.

I am not condoning what Russia did there, but I am more interested in finding ways out the legal and judicial discussion.

Q: My question is more of a philosophic nature. I'd like to ask you if you personally believe that the goal of global nuclear zero is achievable? If yes, if humanity could manage to do so, won't they just come up with just a new type of weapon that will be able to end humanity?

Q: I am really pleased to be here and to listen to your brilliant lecture as well. I will ask two questions. The first one is what do you think: in case North Korea gets the capacity to reach the territory of the United States, is there a chance it will change its rhetoric for a harsher, for more rigorous one? And will be less eager to take concessions? And the second question is a little futuristic. What do you think of the opportunity that issues nonproliferation will one day touch upon other space? Do you believe in the space militarization?

Blix: First, I will take the small question about the one about a nuclear-free world. Verification is important.

At the start of the agreement, you have verification down to 1500, and missiles are even fewer. And it is one of the great values to have verification. But as a get further and further down, verification becomes even more important. When you are down to 100, you don't want to be fooled by the other side. When you are down to 10, even less before you get there. I think that transparency and verification are some of the big, encouraging elements in our world. Now, I remember as a student reading about health stations that were set up in Turkey in the 19th century

because there was a hatch going through and there was a spread of diseases. Turkey objected to that because that hurt their sovereignty. Well, we have a long way since then. Satellites opened up a lot of transparency and thereby, avoiding unpleasant surprises. Governments did not like it, they like having foreigner inspectors roaming around at home. Better to have cameras taking pictures. And the additional protocol was taken even further. Governments have gotten gradually got used to more to more inspections. inspections that is necessary. We have come a long way, and a long way to go. I do not think you can come down very far without also modification in the political structure of the world. You need further development of the UN, and that is hard. That may be even harder than the mechanical inspections. Now we discuss the chances and compositions of the Security Council. Now we have a number of states. I do not think much will happen really if they get in. It will be a more representative Security Council, but all the members sit there and they fend for their own interests. They do not really act as what they should do, mainly as representative in the executive committee of the world. They should act for everybody. That will not immediately change anything. The whole atmosphere, attitude to solving international problems, maybe there could be a new course.

I think this will take time, and maybe even meet catastrophe before the world sees it. I see the current council as a council of the warlord. But that has very much improved since then in 1991. And even today, it is not at all absent. Verified reduction, and also within the political revolution at the same time. That was the easy question.

Now the second question was about North Korea obtaining the ability to reach the United States.

I think it is likely that the US will do something together with China before it happens because politically it is unacceptable for US leadership to be in that situation.

And some people will say that, "well, they can rely on their deterrence, to know that the North Koreans will not do anything to the US without being smashed to pieces thereafter." I do not think the US public will be quite comfortable when it comes to North Korea. I think that when you ask me about the North Korean behavior, well I think that they think they have the perfect protection against the US. The US can not do anything to them.

Last question was about outer space. I am less knowledgeable really, and I wish we could have had chance in that field. I wish we could have the chance to talk to it, but I am not well informed.