

**“U.S.-Russian Dialogue on the NPT Review Process:
Lessons Learned (1970-2017) and Steps Ahead (2018-2020)”**

**US-Russian Working Group on the NPT Review Process
Geneva, Switzerland**

**U.S.-SOVIET AND U.S.-RUSSIAN DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA**

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The U.S.-Soviet/Russian dialogue on the nuclear developments in South Asia shows both successes and failures. Despite a number of disagreements about South Asia, differences in their strategic postures, and crisis in the bilateral relations, Moscow and Washington were able to establish a permanent channel to exchange views on nuclear programs of India and Pakistan and synchronize their international efforts vis-à-vis the nuclear issue in South Asia. As a result, they turned to be on the same page of the history of nuclear programs of India and Pakistan.

Strategic significance of the Indian subcontinent for USSR/Russia and the U.S.

The Soviet and U.S. strategic attention to the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean in general was significantly raised in the beginning of the 1960s and remained high until the end of the 1970s. Unlike the approaches of Moscow and Washington in the 1950s, which mainly focused on political and economic influences in the region, the approaches of the 60s and the 70s aimed at superiority in the nuclear capabilities, deployed in this part of the world. SLBMs were the main instrument of the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Indian Ocean.

After achieving progress in range and precision of ballistic missiles by the middle of the 70s, both powers devaluated the region's role in the nuclear arms race between each other. In 1977-1978, Moscow and Washington held four meetings on the issues,

related to the nuclear weapons deployment in the Indian ocean.¹ A new round of the Cold War in the end of the 70s didn't allow them to continue these negotiations.²

The decision by the Soviet Union to send troops into Afghanistan in 1979 showed to Washington the value of its strategic assets in the Indian ocean. Yet both powers never returned to attempts to match each other's nuclear capabilities in the region. The main interest of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean was shifted to permanent monitoring of the U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities in the region. This was the rationale behind the presence of the Soviet Navy in the ocean.

Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in 1956-85, was supportive of the idea to accept the Indian Ocean as a peace zone, initiated in 1964 by Sri Lanka. This support was partly dictated by financial reasons because through this initiative the Soviet Union could avoid serious spending on supporting its naval operations in the Indian Ocean.³ The United States did not support a peace zone in the Indian Ocean because it could squeeze its operational space and limit American capabilities in the region. (beginning from 1974, the U.S. started large-scale construction on the Diego Garcia island).⁴ This logic explains why the U.S. and USSR/Russia voted differently for the UN General Assembly resolutions on the Indian Ocean as a peace zone (*see Appendix A*).

The United States and USSR/Russian turned the tables in the matter of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. Washington was mainly supportive of the idea and Moscow was mainly abstaining during the vote (*see Appendix B*).

¹ About the U.S.-Soviet talks see: Giblin James Francis. The Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks from a Zone of Peace to the Arc of Crisis. A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. March 1984. Internet Archive.
https://archive.org/stream/indianoceannaval00gibl/indianoceannaval00gibl_djvu.txt (11 October 2017).

² Singh, K.R. Peace Zone: How Relevant? In: Indian Ocean and US-Soviet Détente. New Delhi: International Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, 1991. P. 33-37.

³ Timerbaev Roland. Rasskazy o bylom [Stories about the Past]. Moscow: PIR Center, 2007. P. 114.

⁴ Chopra V.D. American Shadow over the Indian Ocean. In: Indian Ocean and US-Soviet Détente. New Delhi: International Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, 1991. P. 68.

The reasons of this difference lay in the U.S.-Pakistani and USSR-Indian relations. When in 1974, Pakistan tabled its draft of the resolution at the 29th General Assembly session, both Washington and Moscow abstained from voting, but after 1977 the United States supported every resolution on a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. Notably, Washington never ratified any protocol to a nuclear-free zone treaty with one exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, however at every session it voted for Pakistani-drafted resolutions on such a zone in South Asia. Moscow ratified all the protocols to the nuclear-free zone treaties with one exception of the Treaty of Bangkok, not ratified by any nuclear-weapon state.

In 1974, Moscow voted for the Indian draft of the resolution, and later kept abstaining from voting for Pakistani drafts until the Soviet Union collapse. Under the guidance of the first Russian minister of foreign affairs Andrey Kozyrev (1990-96), Moscow changed its voting pattern from abstaining to supporting the initiative.⁵

This change could be explained by shifts of the Russian foreign policy and the role of minister Kozyrev, who particularly opted for better relations with Pakistan. In fact, Moscow thoroughly revisited its views on nuclear nonproliferation threats in South Asia during this period. Both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was clear that Pakistan advanced a range of proposals of political and propaganda nature, possibly as an attempt to hold India back from developing a military nuclear program and thus avoid this costly and dangerous path.

In addition to drafts of resolution on a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, Pakistan proposed, at different times, to create a South Asian ballistic missile-free zone, adopt an Indian-Pakistani declaration to reject acquiring or building nuclear weapons, and place all nuclear sites in India and Pakistan under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Pakistan offered to join the NPT together with India as non-nuclear weapon states, or join the CTBT (also together with India).⁶

⁵ Thomas Raju G.C. South Asian Security in the 1990s. In: Adelphi Papers, No. 278. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993. P. 5.

⁶ Moskalenko Vladimir, Topychkanov Petr. Pakistan and Problems of Nuclear Nonproliferation. In: Second U.S. – Russian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference. Stanford: Stanford University, 2009. P. 233-242.

The U.S. and Soviet/Russian voting records at the UN highlight strategic interests of both players in the region. Respective orientation towards Pakistan and India explains the differences in voting for the Pakistani-drafted resolutions on a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

Washington was building up its military presence in the Asia-Pacific through deployment of both conventional and nuclear capabilities during the Cold War, and it continued to do that after the end of this period. The “Pivot to Asia” strategy of 2012 looked like a logical step in this context.

Soviet/Russian appetites for permanent military deployment in the Indian ocean were nondurable and had the strategic sense only in the 60s and 70s. After that, the main role for the Soviet/Russian military in the region was to monitor U.S. activities. That is why Moscow was positive about a peace zone in the Indian ocean, while the United States took a negative stance.

Reasons for the military nuclear programs of India and Pakistan

India's nuclear program (as well as its ballistic missile program) began during the rule of prime-minister Indira Gandhi (1966-1977, 1980-1984), although her public position was that “India aimed to use the atom for peaceful purposes.”⁷

The rapid development of Pakistan's military nuclear program is associated with the name of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was the president in 1971-1973 and the prime minister in 1973-1977. He began advocating nuclear development in Pakistan in the 1960s. In his book, *The Myth of Independence*, published in 1969, he wrote of nuclear weapons: “Our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in time before the crisis begins.”⁸

⁷ Gandhi Indira. Articles, Speeches, Interviews, translated from English by N.V. Alipova and G.A. Pribegina. Moscow, 1975. P. 320.

⁸ Quote from: Khan Feroz H. *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012. P. 63.

India and Pakistan were motivated to exercise the nuclear option by a tense conjuncture in South Asia, which was determined by a number of factors that were relevant both during and after the Cold War, including:

- Disputes between India and Pakistan;
- Disputes between India and China;
- Disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan;
- Transborder terrorist activity;
- Separatist movements;
- Rivalry between the USSR and the U.S. (during the Cold War).

The security challenges in South Asia caused India and Pakistan to feel that they were in danger. That feeling of insecurity became deeper after neither state managed to obtain security guarantees from the superpowers. Soon after becoming the Indian premier in 1967, concerned by the Chinese nuclear tests since 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri tasked the Ministry of External Affairs to seek for security guarantees from the USSR, the U.S. and the UK.⁹ However, this attempt failed. Islamabad faced the same failure during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which resulted in a defeat for Pakistan and the disintegration of the country. The first serious suspicions that India and Pakistan had begun military nuclear programs could be traced back to that time.

Another important factor in India's and Pakistan's respective decisions to go nuclear was the presence of an opponent who possessed superior general-purpose forces and a program for developing nuclear weapons or other types of WMD. For India, the main sources of the threat were and still are China because of both reasons, that are the conventional imbalance and nuclear arsenal. For Pakistan the both reasons are relevant in its calculations about India, but the nuclear program of India seems to be a more important reason for its own nuclear program.

As for China, this threat became manifested in the escalation of Indian-Chinese relations after the Tibetan events of 1959, India's defeat in an armed conflict with

⁹ Ravichandran Moorthy, Hau Khan Sum, Guido Benny. Power Assymetry and Nuclear Option in India-Pakistan Security Relations. *Asian Journal of Scientific Research*. 2015. No. 8(1). P. 85.

China in 1962, China's entry into the “nuclear club” in 1964, the launch of China's first satellite in 1970, and the existence of territorial disputes between India and China.

The authors of a report prepared by the CIA in 1964 concluded that after the Chinese tests, India would decide to create a nuclear weapon within 1-3 years.¹⁰ During the second half of the 1960s, a number of researchers believed that during that time, out of all the non-nuclear states, India was the closest to deciding to begin a military nuclear program and conducting nuclear tests, and even could possess blueprints for a nuclear explosive device.¹¹

As for Pakistan, India saw a number of threats connected with the acute confrontation between the two countries which had led to armed conflicts on multiple occasions (in 1947-1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999). It also saw threats related to territorial disputes, terrorism, separatism, and, as many in India believed, the secret possession of nuclear weapons since the 1980s and threats to use them.¹² Indian leaders believed that Islamabad had voiced such threats at least twice: in 1986-1987 and in 1990.¹³

A letter that Atal Bihari Vajpayee, prime minister of India (1998-2004), sent to the leaders of foreign states after the nuclear tests in 1998, was a telling example. The letter justified the need to acquire nuclear weapons in terms of threats from India's neighbors, namely China, “an overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962” and Pakistan, a “covert

¹⁰ Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade. National Intelligence Estimate.” 21 October 1964, No. 4-2-64. George Washington University.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb401/docs/doc%203.pdf> (11 October 2017).

¹¹ Edwardes Michael. India, Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons. *International Affairs*. Oct. 1967. Vol. 43. No. 4. P. 658, 661.

¹² Vajpayee Atal Bihari. Yadernye ispytaniya dlya obespecheniya nacional'noy bezopasnosti. [Nuclear tests to ensure national security] In *Indiya na puti v buduscheye: sbornik rechey i vystupleniy* [India's path to the future: compilation of speeches and statements], compiled by Ye.Yu. Vanina et al. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001. P. 24-26.

¹³ Subrahmanyam K. Nuclear Deterrence in the Indian Context. In: Golden Jubilee Seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs.” New Delhi: National Defence College, 2010. P. 60-61.

nuclear weapons state” which had attacked India three times and was continuing to support terrorism in Kashmir.¹⁴

The main incentives for Pakistan to initiate a military nuclear program were the country's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the Indian nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998. In 1964, when suspicions that India planned to create a nuclear weapon were already in place, Ishrat Hussain Usmani, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said, “If there will be a sixth nuclear weapon state, then there will be a seventh one.”¹⁵ According to the report prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. State Department in June 1974, India's nuclear tests would provoke Pakistan to create a nuclear weapon, which, in its turn, would cause India to expand its own nuclear program significantly.¹⁶

U.S.-Soviet/Russian dialogue on the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan

According to Hungarian diplomatic sources, the Soviet Union was informed in advance that India planned to explode a nuclear device in 1974, and it “applied strong pressure to prevent that.”¹⁷

This source was not supported by the document of the U.S. Mission to NATO of 1974 regarding Soviet awareness about the possible nuclear test, but it was supported with respect to the Soviet attempts to bring India to the nonproliferation regime: “The Soviets share our concern about proliferation. They lobbied hard, though unsuccessfully, to get India to sign the NPT. At this point, they are wary of damaging their loose ties with India and have refrained from any public comment. Soviet news accounts have stressed the “peaceful” character of the test. With regard to the question

¹⁴ Quoted in: Talbot Strobe. *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004. P. 53.

¹⁵ Khan Feroz H. *Op. cit.* P. 50.

¹⁶ Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade. National Intelligence Estimate.” 21 October 1964, No. 4-2-64. George Washington University.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb401/docs/doc%203.pdf> (11 October 2017).

¹⁷ Szalontai Balazs. *The Elephant in the Room. The Soviet Union and India’s Nuclear Program, 1967-1989*. In: NPIHP Working Paper. 2011. No. 1. P.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/indian_nuclear_history_and_soviet_relations_-_ver_2.pdf (11 October 2017).

posed by the Netherlands on May 28, we have no information that the Soviets were informed an advance of the test or assisted the Indians directly in carrying it out. Indo-Soviet cooperation in the nuclear field has been limited (far less than Canadian or U.S. programs), and we believe that the Soviets will be even more cautious in the future in sharing nuclear explosive technology with India. In recent years the Soviets have supplied only 45 tons of heavy water (valued at \$4 million), a large computer, and some laboratory equipment.”¹⁸

The key difference between the Soviet and U.S. positions about the 1974 test was the USSR insisted that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion, and the U.S. argued that there was no difference between peaceful and military characters of the nuclear test. For instance, when the Indian foreign secretary Kewal Singh called the U.S. deputy chief of mission David Schneider on 18 May, the American diplomat said: “The U.S. did not believe it possible to distinguish between explosions for peaceful and military purposes.”¹⁹

The Soviet approach to the 1974 test was not one-sided. Despite the fact of descriptions by Moscow of the test as a peaceful, it indicated the serious concern about the path of the Indian nuclear program. That is why Moscow was ready to insist on stringent safeguards for Indo-Soviet deals in the area of peaceful nuclear energy and to suggest a more somber assessment of the Indian nuclear program.²⁰

According to the telegram from 1974 by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, U.S. diplomats had “frequent consultations with the Soviets on IAEA matters through [] respective missions to the IAEA, with an excellent record of cooperation and mutual support in this field.”²¹ The key focus of this dialog was on strengthening export control and nuclear security requirements.²²

¹⁸ U.S. Mission to NATO: Assessment of Indian Nuclear Test. 5 June 1974. George Washington University. <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc18.pdf> (11 October 2017).

¹⁹ Telegram 6591 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, the Interests Section in Syria, and the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 18 May 1974. No. 0600Z. Office of the Historian. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve14p2/d47> (11 October 2017).

²⁰ Potter William. The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation. In: *Slavic Review*. 1985. Vol. 44. No. 3. P. 477.

²¹ State Department Telegram 228213 to U.S. Embassy Moscow, "Nuclear Safeguards Consultations," 17 October 1974. George Washington University.

This level of the U.S.-Russian dialogue on nuclear nonproliferation remained to be high in the 1980s despite a new wave of the Cold War. According to Russian sources, “in the early 1980s, during the U.S.-Soviet crisis caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and plans of SS-20 and Pershing II deployment, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told his close associates that nuclear nonproliferation was the only silk thread connecting the two superpowers at that time.”²³

In general, there was no difference between the Soviet and American positions regarding the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. According to a 1987 telegram from the Embassy of Hungary in Delhi, a Soviet diplomat briefed colleagues from embassies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization about negative consequences of “nearly inevitable” crossing the nuclear threshold by India:

- “The edifice of nuclear non-proliferation will collapse, many pro-Western countries – including Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa – will openly take the path of nuclear armament. The danger of local nuclear conflicts will increase.
- A new anti-Soviet campaign will unfold, claiming that India became a nuclear power with Soviet support.”²⁴

Moscow and Washington attempted to interdict India and Pakistan from further nuclear testing. In February of 1990 Secretary James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze agree to "prepare a document for consideration by their leaders covering both principles and concrete steps of cooperation in all areas of non-proliferation – chemical, missile and nuclear."

Later that year U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made the Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation following a Washington summit:

<http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb467/docs/doc%209C%2010-17-74%20cable%20to%20Moscow.pdf> (11 October 2017).

²² Timerbaev Roland. Nuclear Suppliers Group: Why and How It Was Created (1974-1978). Moscow: PIR Center, 2000.

²³ Orlov Vladimir, Timerbaev Roland and Khlopkov Anton. Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S.-Russian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities. Moscow: PIR Center, 2002. P. 14

²⁴ Szalontai Balazs. Op. cit. (11 October 2017).

- The U.S. and USSR strongly support efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, while encouraging the peaceful uses of atomic energy;
- Both countries will encourage further adherence to the NPT;
- Both will urge signatories to the NPT to implement scrupulously their IAEA safeguards, and support stringent export controls on nuclear-related material, equipment and technology;
- The U.S. and USSR support the concept of regional non- proliferation efforts, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East, South Asia and Southern Africa.

The joint pressure from Washington and Moscow did not stop India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in 1998. One of several examples of joint efforts was the cancelation of the Indo-Russian deal on cryogen engines for Indian space launchers, unilaterally made by Moscow in mid-1990s. This decision did not enjoy unanimous support within Russia. The Russian government received negative reaction from the State Duma and space industry. But it was an active dialogue between Moscow and Washington. The dialogue was performed by the United States in a “stick and carrot” way. The “stick” was the U.S. sanctions on Glavkosmos, lead to the cancelation of the cryogen deal, and the “carrot” was a number of political and economic stimulus.²⁵ According to Russian and American researchers, “the episode harmonized Russian and U.S. positions in a potentially contentious area of national-security policy, contributing to an overall cooperative relationship between the two countries.”²⁶

The official explanation by India of the decision to test nuclear weapons was focused on China as the main threat and Pakistan as a secret possessor of nuclear weapons.²⁷ After the Indian tests in 1998, Lal Krishna Advani, India's Minister of Home Affairs

²⁵ Simha Rakesh Krishnan. How India’s Cryogenic Programme was Wrecked. 4 December 2013. Russia beyond the Headlines.

https://www.rbth.com/blogs/2013/12/04/how_indias_cryogenic_programme_was_wrecked_31365 (11 October 2017).

²⁶ Gibson Ryan, Kirichenko Elina, Pikayev Alexander, Spector Leonard. Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In: Adelphi Papers, No. 317. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998. P. 61.

²⁷ Vajpayee Atal Bihari. Op. cit. P. 24-26.

(1998–2004), said, “Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world. It must roll back its anti-India policy especially with regard to Kashmir. Any other course will be futile and costly for Pakistan.”²⁸

This and similar statements by Indian politicians have given the Pakistanis a good opportunity to justify and test their development of military nuclear technologies on the basis of the need to defend the country from its neighbor. At a press conference on May 28, 1998, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997–1999) emphasized that “immediately after its nuclear tests, India has brazenly raised the demand that 'Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region' and threatened that 'India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan.' Our security, and peace and stability of the entire region was thus gravely threatened... Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership's reckless actions... After due deliberations and a careful review of all options, we took the decision to restore the strategic balance... Our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the interest of national self-defense. These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.”²⁹

The dangerous development in the South Asia made the United States and Russia to jointly call Indian and Pakistan “to stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the development of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.”³⁰

²⁸ Inderjit Sabina. Advani Tells Pakistan to Roll Back Its Anti-India Policy. In: Times of India. 19 May 1998.

²⁹ Text of Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests, Islamabad, May 28, 1998. Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd26/26pak.htm> (11 October 2017).

³⁰ Security Council Resolution 1172(1998) on International Peace and Security, 6/6/1998. <http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/sc6528.doc.htm> (11 October 2017).

The United States and Russia reacted to the nuclear tests in South Asia in different ways. Moscow was more vocal in comparison to the Soviet reaction to the 1974 nuclear test. However, in terms of real impact, only sanctions by the United States and Japan had material significance for India and Pakistan.³¹ For the Russian policy in the region, the nuclear tests meant limitations in areas of cooperation mainly with India, while for the United States they meant derailment of the Clinton administration initiative to put the relations with India and Pakistan on sounder footing.³²

Conclusions

The U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian dialogue on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, analyzed in the paper, provides two lessons. The first one shows shared concerns and joint efforts regarding the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. The second one demonstrates how disagreements between the USSR/Russia and the United States could be affective for their joint efforts in South Asia.

The first lesson from the Moscow and Washington efforts vis-à-vis the South Asian nuclear problem could be described in the phrase by the former minister of foreign affairs Alexey Gromyko about the silk thread of nuclear nonproliferation connecting the two superpowers in troubling times. The value of this thread should not be questioned due to temporary political circumstances. It is still valuable for the U.S.-Russian dialogue. It still allows both countries to remain on the same page in the areas of international security and nuclear nonproliferation.

The second lesson could be explained in terms of U.S.-Soviet rivalry that boosted, though not being the primary reason for, nuclear developments in South Asia. Deep differences between Moscow and Washington did not allow to achieve a success for the initiatives to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone and to turn the Indian ocean into a zone of peace.

³¹ Synnott Hilary. The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests. In: *Adelphi Papers*, No. 332. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999. P. 29.

³² Talbott Strobe. Dealing with the Bomb in South Assia. In: *Foreign Affairs*. 1999. Vol. 78. No. 2. P. 110-111.

The U.S.-Soviet/Russian disagreements were virtuously used by both India and Pakistan to avoid the pressure and achieve their goals in the field of nuclear energy and military nuclear programs.

Appendix A

| U.S.-Soviet/Russian voting on GA Resolutions on the Indian Ocean as a peace zone, 1971-2015 | | | |
|--|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Date | Number | USA | USSR/Russia |
| 12/16/77 | A/RES/2832(XXVI) | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/15/72 | A/RES/2992(XXVII) | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/6/73 | A/RES/3080(XXVIII) | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/9/74 | A/RES/3259(XXIX)B | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/9/74 | A/RES/3259(XXIX)A | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/11/75 | A/RES/3468(XXX) | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/14/76 | A/RES/31/88 | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/12/77 | A/RES/32/86 | Abstention | Yes |
| 12/14/78 | A/RES/33/68 | Abstention | Yes |
| 12/11/79 | A/RES/34/80B | Abstention | Yes |
| 12/11/79 | A/RES/34/80A | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/12/80 | A/RES/35/150 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/9/81 | A/RES/36/90 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/13/82 | A/RES/37/96 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/20/83 | A/RES/38/185 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/17/84 | A/RES/39/149 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/16/85 | A/RES/40/153 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/4/86 | A/RES/41/87 | Adopted without vote | |
| 11/30/87 | A/RES/42/43 | Adopted without vote | |
| 12/7/88 | A/RES/43/79 | Adopted without vote | |

| | | | |
|----------|--------------|----|-----|
| 11/15/89 | A/RES/44/120 | No | Yes |
| 12/12/90 | A/RES/45/77 | No | Yes |
| 12/9/91 | A/RES/46/49 | No | Yes |
| 12/9/92 | A/RES/47/59 | No | Yes |
| 12/16/93 | A/RES/48/82 | No | Yes |
| 12/15/94 | A/RES/49/82 | No | Yes |
| 12/12/95 | A/RES/50/76 | No | Yes |
| 12/10/96 | A/RES/51/51 | No | Yes |
| 12/9/97 | A/RES/52/44 | No | Yes |
| 12/1/99 | A/RES/54/47 | No | Yes |
| 11/29/01 | A/RES/56/16 | No | Yes |
| 12/8/03 | A/RES/58/29 | No | Yes |
| 12/8/05 | A/RES/60/48 | No | Yes |
| 12/5/07 | A/RES/62/14 | No | Yes |
| 12/2/09 | A/RES/64/23 | No | Yes |
| 12/2/11 | A/RES/66/22 | No | Yes |
| 12/5/13 | A/RES/68/24 | No | Yes |
| 12/7/15 | A/RES/70/22 | No | Yes |

Appendix B

| U.S.-Soviet/Russian Voting on GA Resolutions on Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia, 1974-97 | | | |
|---|---------------------|------------|--------------------|
| Date | Number | USA | USSR/Russia |
| 12/9/74 | A/RES/3265(XXIX)[A] | Abstention | Yes |
| 12/9/74 | A/RES/3265(XXIX)[B] | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/10/76 | A/RES/31/73 | Abstention | Abstention |
| 12/12/77 | A/RES/32/83 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/14/78 | A/RES/33/65 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/11/79 | A/RES/34/78 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/12/80 | A/RES/35/148 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/9/81 | A/RES/36/88 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/9/82 | A/RES/37/76 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/15/83 | A/RES/38/65 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/12/84 | A/RES/39/55 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/12/85 | A/RES/40/83 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/3/86 | A/RES/41/49 | Yes | Abstention |
| 11/30/87 | A/RES/42/29 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/7/88 | A/RES/43/66 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/15/89 | A/RES/44/109 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/4/90 | A/RES/45/53 | Yes | Abstention |
| 12/6/91 | A/RES/46/31 | Yes | Yes |
| 12/9/92 | A/RES/47/49 | Yes | Yes |
| 12/16/93 | A/RES/48/72 | Yes | Yes |

| | | | |
|----------|-------------|-----|-----|
| 12/15/94 | A/RES/49/72 | Yes | Yes |
| 12/12/95 | A/RES/50/67 | Yes | Yes |
| 12/10/96 | A/RES/51/42 | Yes | Yes |
| 12/23/97 | A/RES/52/35 | Yes | Yes |